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REAL ESTATE BROKER'S CONTRACT-
BROKER'S RIGHTS TO COMPENSATION
FOR A SALE BY THE VENDOR UNDER AN
EXCLUSIVE-RIGHT-TO-SELL AGREEMIENT*
I. I ODUCTIoN
Ascertaining the precise overt act that entitles a real estate
broker to his commission has been and continues to be a prolific
area for litigation. The Kentucky Court of Appeals confronted
this dilemma in Shanklin v. Townsend.1 The court in Townsend
decided that a "sale" was the necessary overt act that entitled
the broker to his commission. In the court's opinion a "sale"
under an exclusive-right-to-sell brokerage contract was executed
when a contract of sale was made to sell the listed property
although the contract of sale was later rescinded.
The appellee Townsend was one of the owners of certain
property that was put up for sale. Townsend and the other
owners contracted with the appellant Shanklin's real estate firm
to aid them in finding a buyer and effectuating a "sale." The
contract was dated March 17, 1964, and was to terminate after
one year. The contract provided that the brokers would be en-
titled to their commission when a sale of the property was made
regardless of by whom the sale was effectuated 2 (a provision of
this type is the distinguishing feature of an exclusive-right-
to-sell brokerage contract). The contract further stipulated
that the commission was to be five per centum of the $713,000
asking price or five per centum of whatever the eventual sales
price happened to be.
The appellee Townsend without any assistance from the ap-
pellant Shanklin found a prospective buyer. Townsend granted
the intended buyer an option contract to purchase the property
for $626,200. This option was exercised on October 20, 1964,
with the execution of a contract of sale. The buyer tendered to
Townsend $20,000 that was to be applied towards the purchase
price if the contract was honored, but if it was not honored, the
$20,000 was to be considered liquidated damages. The contract
* Shanklin v. Tovnsend, 431 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1968).
1. 431 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1968).
2. Id. at 875.
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was rescinded by the buyer, and the owners accepted the $20,000
as a satisfactory settlement for their damages.
Shanklin's real estate firm sued for its commission. Shanklin
contended that the broker's only obligation for the brokerage
commission to accrue under an exclusive-right-to-sell contract
was the "sale" of the listed property. A "sale" of the property,
he argued, had occurred with the formation of the executory
contract of sale.
The court of appeals overruled the lower court and held for
the appellant real estate broker. The court reasoned that because
a contract of sale is a "sale" when the broker procures a buyer,
there is also a sale when the seller procures a buyer under an
exclusive-right-to-sell brokerage agreement.3 Thus, the require-
ment entitling the broker to his commission had been fulfilled,
i.e. a "sale" had taken place.
The primary purpose of this article is to consider the
Shankoin court's reasons for granting the commission to the
broker and the other approaches upon which the court could
have based the decision. Secondly, this article discusses the
effect on the Kentucky brokerage law by the precedent estab-
lished in the Shankbin case. The exclusive-right-to-sell agree-
ment is the primary brokerage contract considered; however, in
order to put the exclusive-right-to-sell contract in its proper
perspective it is necessary to consider brokerage contracts in
general and to focus on the consequential elements of each type
of real estate brokerage contract: the concept of "sale", the dam-
ages for breach, and the right to commissions.
II. BRoK tAGE CoNTiucTS
The parties to a brokerage contract have the freedom to con-
tract as they see fit.4 Among other things, they may designate
at what point the broker is to receive his commission, the con-
sideration to be given to establish a binding agreement, the
length of time in which the contract will be binding, and the
parties who may sell the property while the contract is in force.
The parties to the contract also have the freedom to put condi-
tions in the brokerage agreements that alter their legal positions
3. For the purposes of this article a brokerage agreement and a brokerage
contract have the same meaning and are interchangeable.
4. See generally 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 29 (1963).
1969]
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as broker and seller.5 The judiciary in construing the legal
duties of the parties generally ascertain the intended meaning
of the conditions from within the four corners of the brokerage
contract.0 The courts have generally recognized three distinct
classifications of brokerage contracts: the general "listing"
agreement, the exclusive-agency contract, and the exclusive-
right-to-sell agreement.7
A general "listing" contract is the most common brokerage
agreement. Anyone, including another agent and the vendor,
may sell the real property contracted to be sold without the
broker's right to a commission accruing. For the purposes of a
general "listing" agreement the broker makes a "sale" when he
procures a ready, willing, and able buyer or when he procures
a contract of sale with the buyer and seller as parties.8 Once
the broker has fulfilled these requirements for a "sale" under a
general "listing" contract he has earned his commission. 9
The general "listing" contract is uniformly recognized as an
unilateral contract. The consideration given by the broker is
5. Island Greek Fuel & Transp. Co. v. Kenova Terminal Co., 150 F. Supp.
479 (S.D.W. Va. 1957); Inman v. Clyde Hold Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 498
(Alas. 1962); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d
845 (1961); Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Wood, 252 Miss. 580,
172 So. 2d 196 (1965); Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 582, 236
A.2d 843 (1967) ; see Note, The Real Estate Broker's Right to a Commission
Upon the Procurement of a Purchaser Ready, Willing, and Able to Purchase,
41 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 67, 83 (1964); 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 295 (1963).
6. See General Cas. Co. of America v. Azteca Films, Inc., 278 F.2d 161
(9th Cir. 1960) ; Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Murray, 231 Ark. 559, 331
S.W.2d 98 (1960) ; Lalow v. Codomo, 101 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1958) ; Duncan v.
Turner, 171 Mo. App. 661, 154 S.W. 816 (1913).
7. The general "listing" agreement offers the broker the least protection
of his commission, while the exclusive-right-to-sell offers him the greatest
amount of protection. The broker, however, is not denied any of the rights he
may have under a contract of lesser protection when he enters into a contract
offering greater protection. There is a presumption that a real estate agree-
ment to sell is a general "listing" contract unless the agreement shows that
this was not the intent of the parties. See, e.g., Yondorf, The Rights of a
Broker Under an Exclusive Listing Contract, 40 CHi. B. Rxc. 225 (1958);
Comment, Exclusive Sales Rights Given to Real Estate Brokers, 6 DE PAUL
L. REv. 107 (1956).
8. Shopen v. Bone, 328 F2d 655 (8th Cir. 1964); Wickersam v. Harris,
313 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1963); Deeble v. Stearns, 82 Cal. App. 2d 296, 186
P.2d 173 (1947); T.W. Sandford & Co. v. Waring, 20 Ky. 169, 256 S.W. 9
(1923); Walker v. Russell, 24 Mass. 386, 134 N.E. 388 (1922); Lohman v.
Edgewater Holding Co., 227 Minn. 40, 33 N.W.2d 842 (1948).
9. Knight v. Taylor Real Estate & Ins. Co., 38 Ala. App. 295, 83 So. 2d
353 (1955) ; Wood v. Planzer, 73 Ga. App. 731, 37 S.E.2d 813 (1946) ; Wilson
v. Mason, 158 11. 304, 42 N.E. 134 (1895) ; Brinton v. Motte, 244 S.W.2d 480
(Ky. 1951); Swinebroad v. Foster, 195 Ky. 459, 244 S.W. 881 (1922). See,
e.g., 72 Dxcx. L. REv. 522 (1968) ; 12 Ams. JuR. 2d Brokers § 182 (1964).
[Vol. 21
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performance. He must procure a buyer before a binding con-
tract is formed.'0
An exclusive-agency contract precludes all others who might
act as agents for the seller from executing a "sale."" It does
not, however, preclude the seller from making a "sale" him-
self.12 If a "sale" is made by anyone other than the exclusive
agent or the property owner, the broker still has a contractual
right to his commission or a right to damages for the breach
of the contract.'3 Thus, a broker earns his commission either
when he procures a party as under a "listing" agreement or
when some other agent makes a sale. In either case the law
maintains that a "sale" has been made.
Generally, consideration is necessary for any contract to be
legally enforceable. 14 Some jurisdictions hold that for an exclu-
sive-agency brokerage agreement to be binding mutual promises
between the owner and the broker are the only consideration
necessary.' 5  Other jurisdictions hold, however, that a promise
by the seller must be set-off with partial performance by the
broker before the brokerage contract is enforceable.' 6 The pre-
10. Once a contract of sale, which has as a party a purchaser, procured by
the broker, is formed with the seller, the seller is under an affirmative duty in
most jurisdictions to enforce the contract. Thus, a broker may receive his
commission whether or not the seller enforces the contract. Of course, the
parties may stipulate in the brokerage agreement that the broker's commission
is only due upon a consummation of a sale, the commissions are to be paid
upon the receipt of the purchase money, or some other requirement limiting
the duty of the seller to enforce the contract of sale. At any rate, the procured
buyer must be acceptable to the seller before any right to a commission
accrues. See, e.g., 72 DIcK L. REv. 522 (1968); Comment, The Right of a
Real Estate Broker to a Commission in California, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 152
(1969); Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 437 (1960); RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 445
(1933). But cf. Sweet v. H.R. Howenstein Co., 73 F.2d 660 (D.D.C. 1934).
11. See, e.g., Firszt v. Wdowiak, 104 Conn. 528, 133 A. 586 (1926); Nick-
olas v. Bursley, 119 So. 2d 722 (Fla. App. 1960); Irish v. Fisher, 74 Ga. App.
631, 40 S.E.2d 588 (1946); Flynn v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 9 Ill. 2d 129, 137
N.E.2d 71 (1956); Note, In General: Licenses, Registration and Employment
of Brokers, 41 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 40 (1964).
12. See, e.g., Annot., 28 A.L.R. 886 (1924); Note, supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., 12 Am. Jim. 2d Brokers § 64 (1964) ; Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 936
(1963) ; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 449, comment d at 363 (1957).
14. The exclusive-agency and exclusive-right-to-sell brokerage agreements
appear to have two distinct consideration requirements. Besides the exchange
of promises mentioned in the text to make an enforceable contract, the seller
must pay the broker his commission in exchange for a "sale" being made.
That is to say, that for the consideration of a sale being made the owner has
a duty to pay the broker his commission. This type of brokerage agreement
then is one with a dual exchange of consideration-each separate and distinct.
15. See, e.g., Meyer, The Broker's Exclusive Listing Contract, 61 W. VA.
L. REV. 274 (1958).
16. Id.
1969]
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vailing view appears to be that the mutual promises of the
broker and seller are sufficient consideration to make the contract
enforceable; the broker promises to use his "time and facilities"
to secure a purchaser in return for the seller's promise to leave
the "sale" open for the broker during the stated contract
period.1
7
The exclusive-right-to-sell agreement, which was the center
of controversy in the banklin case, entitles a broker to his com-
mission or damages when a "sale" is made by anyone, including
the owner, within the contract period.1 8 The feature of an ex-
clusive-right-to-sell contract that distinguishes it from the exclu-
elusive-agency contract is the lack of the owner's right to execute
a tsale."
It is apparent that the "sale" of the property is the important
aspect of any real estate broker's agreement. The concept of
"sale" varies to some extent in each of the three general types
of brokerage agreements. In order to determine when a broker's
commissions accrue, it is important to know exactly when a
Nsale" occurs.
III. Tm CowcEPT oF "SALE"
The Skandin court decided that a "sale" under an exclusive-
right-to-sell brokerage agreement was a contract of sale even
when the contract was procured by the seller without the assist-
ance of the broker and subsequently not enforced by the seller.
Although the court used only a few decisions from other juris-
dictions to buttress its conclusion, there is additional case
authority arriving at the same result.
The leading American case on the point is Lewis v. Da l,1 9
which is relied upon in the Shanlin opinion. It is usually said
to stand for the proposition that an oral contract of sale for
real estate between a seller and buyer is not a "sale" since such
an agreement by virtue of the Statute of Frauds is not enforce-
able. By negatively stating that an oral contract of sale was
17. Comment, supra note 7, at 110. See generally Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
18. Molbert v. Block-Meeks Realty Co., 227 Ark. 246, 297 S.W2d 929
(1957); Pfarner v. Poston Realty & Ins. Agency, 109 Ga. App. 14, 134 S.E.2d
835 (1964); Power v. Security Say. & Trust Co., 38 Idaho 289, 222 P. 779
(1923) ; Byers Bros. Real Estate & Ins. Agency v. Campbell, 329 S.W.2d 393
Mo. App. 1959) ; Szemis v. Szachta, 172 Pa. Super. 351, 93 A2d 892 (1953);
see 8 DE PAUL L. Rhv. 100 (1958).
19. 108 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362 (1945).
[Vol. 91
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not a "sale," the Lewis court concluded that a written agree-
ment was a "sale." The Lewis case, therefore, while dealing with
the problem of an oral agreement and never actually confront-
ing the precise factual situation that brought about the
Shanklin litigation,20 was cited by the Shanklin court as being
supporting authority.
Several other jurisdictions have reached the same result
as the Kentucky Court did in Shanklin.21 These cases, however,
are distinguishable on their facts. The usual factual situation
confronted has been that, after the brokerage agreement has
terminated, a "sale" has been consummated by the owner under
a contract of sale that had been executed by the owner and buyer
during the contract period. Such a "sale" has been said to be an
obvious effort on the part of the owner to defraud the broker of
his rightful commission.22 Thus, all of these cases have reached
the same conclusion: A "sale" is a contract of sale for the pur-
poses of an exclusive-right-to-sell brokerage agreement. There
was no consummated "sale" by the owners in the Skzanklin case,
however, either before or after the termination of the brokerage
agreement.23
The Shanklin court's decision to grant the commission to the
broker appears at first glance to be unjust. There was obviously
no intent to deprive the broker of his commission, and the
property was still retained by the owner. The brokers did not
prove that they had expended any time or money in attempting
20. Id. In the Lewis case the plaintiff, a real estate broker, sued for his
commission contending that a "sale" had been made when the defendant, the
owner of the property, negotiated an oral agreement with a buyer to sell the
property. The broker and the owner had executed an exclusive-right-to-sell
brokerage contract stipulating that the broker's commission would accrue when
the broker or anyone else executed a "sale." The oral agreement between the
buyer and seller postponed the delivery of a deed until the brokerage contract
had terminated. The broker attempted to show that such an oral contract was
an attempt to defraud him of his rightful commission.
The court determined that since the oral contract was not binding, the broker
retained the legal right to procure a buyer and effectuate a "sale" until the
brokerage agreement had terminated. The broker, therefore, was not entitled
to his commission.
21. See, e.g., Whitehurst v. Erstling, 184 So. 2d 333 (Fla. App. 166); Alex
D. Smith Real Estate, Inc. v. Gables Venetian Waterways, Inc., 98 So. 2d 372
(Fla. 1957); Dobbs v. Conyers, 36 Ga. App. 511, 137 S.E. 298 (1927); see
Annot., 160 A.L.R. 1040 (1946).
22. Alex D. Smith Real Estate, Inc. v. Gables Venetian Waterways, Inc.,
98 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1957).
23. For the purposes of this article a "sale" and a consummated "sale" are
not the same. A consummated "sale" takes place when a deed to the property
is actually delivered. A "sale" denotes many transactions as will be shown in
the pages that follow, including a contract of sale.
1969]
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to procure a buyer for the owners. The first impression of the
case is that the broker has been unjustly enriched. An analysis
of the reasoning of the Shanklin court tends to make the
decision even more questionable.
The court cites several Kentucky cases which conclude that a
"sale" is made by the broker when he procures a ready, willing
and able buyer or a contract of sale. 24 All of the cited cases,
however, deal with a general "listing" agreement. The court
fails to cite any cases that deal with the exclusive-right-to-sell
contract, which is the situation in the Shznkli case. As pointed
out previously, the consequential elements and effects of the
two types of contracts are readily distinguishable. The concept
of "sale" is one of these consequential elements of a brokerage
agreement that distinguishes an exclusive-right-to-sell contract
from a general "listing" contract.
The dissent of Justice Osborne in Shanklin observes that the
definition of a "sale" as used in connection with a general
"listing" agreement is an exception to the general concept that a
sale of property is a transmutation.25 But such an exception,
Justice Osborne asserts, is needed to provide the broker a
"shield" with which he may protect his commission.26 If the
broker's commission was dependent on an actual transmutation
of property, the broker could be denied his rightful commission
if an unscrupulous seller refused to consumate a "sale" with a
broker-procured buyer or refused to enforce a contract of sale
that the broker had procured from his buyer. The law protects
the broker from these mub rosa tactics of a seller by defining a
"sale" under a general "listing" agreement as occurring at a
point in time before the consummated "sale" occurs. That is, a
"sale" takes place when the broker procures a contract of sale
or procures a ready, willing, and able buyer; at this point the
broker is entitled to his commission.
The exclusive-right-to-sell brokerage agreement includes the
protection offered to the broker in a general "listing" agreement.
A broker, however, has additional protection under an exclu-
24. Odem Realty Co. v. Dryer, 242 Ky. 58, 45 S.W.2d 838 (1932) ; Ferguson
v. Harris, 200 Ky. 146, 254 S.W. 329 (1923) ; T.W. Sandford & Co. v. War-
ing, 201 Ky. 169, 256 S.W. 9 (1923); Swinebroad v. Foster, 196 Ky. 459, 244
S.W. 881 (1922); Casey v. Hart Wallace & Co., 188 Ky. 441, 222 S.W. 111
(1920).
25. Rice v. Ware & Harper, 3 Ga. App. 349, 60 S.E. 301 (1908); O'Reilly
v. Keim, 54 N.J. Eq. 423, 34 A. 1073 (1896) ; 46 Am. Jura Sales § 2 (1943).
26. 431 S.W.2d at 880.
[V'ol. 21
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sive-right-to-sell contract since the broker has a right of action
against the seller if anyone other than the broker transfers the
property. It is evident, therefore, that the concept of "sale"
under the two types of brokerage agreements can be readily dis-
tinguished.27
A contract of sale procured by the broker on the one hand is
not analogous to a contract of sale procured by the seller on the
other.28 The purpose, in defining a "sale" as a contract of sale
when the broker procures the buyer is to protect the broker.
The broker in the case of a broker-procured buyer has rendered
performance that can readily be seen as sufficient to entitle him
to a commission. But when the seller procures a buyer the
performance of the broker cannot be readily seen. The broker's
need for legal protection in the latter case is not as apparent as
the need for protection in the former. The broker in the latter
situation retains the right to show that he cannot perform his
obligation because of the breach of the duty of the seller who
drew up a contract of sale. Each case would entitle him to
some measure of compensation for the wrongful action of the
seller. But simply to say that a contract of sale made with a
buyer by the seller while an exclusive-right-to-sell brokerage
contract is in existence, is a "sale" entitling the broker to his
commission, affords unnecessary protection to the broker at the
expense of the seller-particularly if the contract of sale is
rescinded soon after being entered into by seller and buyer.
The Shanklin decision, nevertheless, neglects to distinguish the
exclusive-right-to-sell and the general "listing" agreements and
states that "the word 'sold' must be given the same meaning in
the one event as it would have been given in the other."2 9
The definitions of "sale" are as abundant as the factual situa-
tions from which sales originate. 30 Thus, what is a "sale" in one
instance is not necessarily a "sale" in another. Blackstone's defi-
nition of a "sale" is the generally accepted criterion for establish-
ing a "sale" in most jurisdictions.81 Blackstone defines "sale"
27. See stpra note 4.
28. 431 S.W.2d at 880.
29. Id. at 876.
30. "The word sale has not a fixed and invariable meaning." Mattingly v.
Bohn, 84 Ariz. 369, 371, 329 P.2d 1095, 1096 (1958).
31. See, e.g., Edwards v. Baldwin Piano Co., 79 Fla. 143, 83 So. 915 (1920);
John Whiteman & Co. v. Fidei, 176 Pa. Super. 142, 106 A.2d 644 (1954);
McElhinney v. Belsky, 165 Pa. Super. 546, 69 A.2d 178 (1949); 46 Am. Jim.
Sales § 2 (1943).
1969]
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as a "transmutation of property from one man to another in con-
sideration of some price or recompense in value."3 2 Exceptions to
this definition are made as justice demands. The concept of a
"sale" in a general "listing" agreement has been one of these
exceptions.33
Blackstone's concept of a "sale" has been the basis for de-
riving definitions of "sale" to fit particular purposes as well as
for ascertaining exceptions. A transfer to a mortgagee has been
held to be a "sale"34 whereas a transfer into a partnership by
one of the partners has been held not to be a "sale." 35 A
common definition of "sale" is a transfer of title.3 6 The Uni-
form Sales Act provided that "a sale of goods is an agreement
whereby the seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer
for a consideration called the price."37
The Uniform Commercial Code states that "a sale" consists of
passing title from the seller to the buyer for a price.38 It also
distinguishes a contract of sale from a "sale."39 Many cases have
distinguished a "sale" from a contract of sale for a specific situa-
tion,40 and many courts have likewise found that in certain
factual circumstances a contract of sale and a "sale" are one and
the same.
41
The purpose of the above discussion has not been to show that
the court erred in defining the contract of sale as a "sale"; but
has merely been to show that the court did not necessarily have
to come to that particular conclusion with respect to recovery
of commissions. At the same time it must be recognized that the
32. 46 AM. JuR. Sales § 2 (1943).
33. See Rice v. Ware & Harper, 3 Ga. App. 349, 60 S.E. 301 (1908);
O'Reilly v. Keim, 54 N.J. Eq. 423, 34 A. 1073 (1896).
34. John Whiteman & Co. v. Fidei, 176 Pa. Super. 142, 106 A.2d 644 (1954).
35. McElhinney v. Belsky, 165 Pa. Super. 546, 69 A.2d 178 (1949).
36. See, e.g., Hatch v. Standard Oil Co., 100 U.S. 124 (1879) ; South Caro-
lina Cotton Growers' Co-Op. Ass'n v. Weil, 220 Ala. 568, 126 So. 637 (1929).
See generally 46 AM. JuR. Sales § 2 (1943).
37. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 1.
38. UNIFORM COiaMMERCLAL CODE § 2-106. See generally Comment, Commer-
cial Transactions Warranties-Implied Warranties of Quality Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 20 S.C.L. REv. 323, 324 (1968).
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106.
40. E.g., Christensen v. Cram, 156 Cal. 633, 105 P. 950 (1909); Davis v.
Roseberry, 95 Kan. 411, 148 P. 629 (1915); Andrews v. Connick, 209 App.
Div. 161, 204 N.Y.S. 6 (1924).
41. E.g., Needham v. Jameson, 66 S.D. 131, 279 N.W. 538 (1938); Trav-
elers Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 133 Tex. 534, 130 S.W2d 1026 (1939); Houston,
E. & W. Ry. v. Keller, 90 Tex. 214, 37 S.W. 1062 (1931).
[Vol. 21
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case involved an exclusive-right-to-sell contract which is not com-
pletely analogous to a general "listing" contract. A "sale" in
one instance does not necessarily have to be a "sale" in the
other. Nevertheless, the court, by defining a "sale" as a contract
of sale, in the case of an exclusive-right-to-sell contract, closed
the door to any alternative solutions for similar litigation in the
future regardless of the factual situation. The Shanklin case
established a precedent setting definition of "sale." The ramifi-
cations of the case may be insurmountable and may result in
undue hardship on the seller.
42
IV. Tim EFTCT 'F SHnANMI
As Mr. Justice Osborne's dissent demonstrates, the ,Su/nkin
decision has added a "sword" to the brokerage contract with
which the broker may attack the unwary seller.43 The prior
brokerage contract decisions in Kentucky which defined "sale"
as a contract of sale dealt with a contract that had been pro-
cured by the broker. As has been mentioned previously, the pur-
pose, in holding that a contract of sale between a broker-pro-
cured buyer and the seller is a "sale," is to protect the broker
from the unscrupulous seller. The concept of a "sale" as applied
to a general "listing" brokerage contract was not intended,
however, as a means to place the seller at the mercy of a derelict
real estate broker.
After Shlnkln, the agent who operates under an exclusive-
right-to-sell agreement is in a position to have his commission
accrue regardless of whether a consummation of sale is made
- the intent of all brokerage agreements. The broker need
not show that he intended to use his facilities and time to pro-
cure a buyer as he had promised. lie must show only that he
has made the promise with an enforceable contract resulting.
This case has opened the door for the unscrupulous agent to
enter into a contract with a seller and wait out the contractual
period with the hope that someone will make a contract of sale.
A consummated sale need not be made within this period. There-
fore, without proving more than an overt promise and the for-
42. The court attempted to buttress its decision with the case of Hartig v.
Schrader, 190 Ky. 511, 227 S.W. 815 (1921). Hartig states in dictim that a
sale of land in Kentucky was an executory contract of sale. But, needless to
say, the Shanklin court was not bound by the dictum in this decision.
43. 431 S.W2d at 880.
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mation of a contract of sale for the listed property, the broker
becomes entitled to his commission.
The agent's ability to perform the contract, moreover, appears
to be unimportant under Shan nAi in ascertaining his right to
a commission. An agent need not show that he had the ability
at all times during the existence of the exclusive-right-to-sell
agreement to perform his part of the contract before he is en-
titled to his commission.
Suppose the seller and buyer enter into a contract of sale dur-
ing the existence of an exclusive-right-to-sell agreement. Before
the brokerage agreement terminates, the contract of sale is re-
scinded leaving the property under contract "unsold." Has the
broker's right to a commission accrued although there still re-
mains time in which he could procure a buyer and although
there is no longer any obstruction hindering his performance?
Under such circumstances, if the Shanklin case is followed, the
requirement of the brokerage agreement that a "sale" be made
for the broker's commission to accrue has been performed by
executing a contract of sale.
By defining a "sale" as a contract of sale regardless of the
existing factual situation when dealing with an exclusive-right-
to-sell brokerage agreement, the Shanklin opinion has placed an
immovable obstruction in the path of a seller who contemplates
entering into an exclusive-right-to-sell agreement and fears that
the broker may not attempt to sell the property. If the seller
executes a contract of sale, the brokerage commission will
accrue regardless of the broker's ability or intent to perform.
The court, therefore, excludes the possibility that the formation
of a contract of sale is a breach of the owner's promise to leave
the sale open exclusively for the broker for the duration of the
contract period which would entitle the broker only to damages.
V. DAMAGES OR CommmiSoNs
The Kentucky court excluded the possibility that, instead of a
fulfillment of the brokerage contract requirements, the contract
of sale executed by the seller is to be viewed as an actual breach
of the brokerage agreement. If the court had concluded that
there was a breach of the brokerage agreement, the broker
would have been entitled to damages. The damages may or may
not have been the commission due under the agreement.
[Vol. 21
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COMMENTS
Damages have been awarded in many jurisdictions for the
actual consummation of a "sale." 44 These courts have based
their decisions on the proposition that the seller has breached
his promise not to sell the property while the exclusive-right-
to-sell brokerage agreement is in force. Thus for the breach of
the contract the broker is entitled to damages. The contract has
not been fully performed and the commission is not to be
granted. In most cases, however, the damages granted for a
breach by an actually executed "sale" are usually the commis-
sion that would have been paid if the contract had been proper-
ly performed.45
Most jurisdictions consider a consummated "sale" as rendering
the performance of the broker impossible and constituting a
breach of the contract.4 6 In such cases the broker must be able
to prove his damages. 47
The ShankUn opinion cites the Kentucky case of Carter V.
Hall" to substantiate its position that a consummated "sale"
by the owner of property who has entered into an exclusive-
right-to-sell agreement with a broker allows the broker to col-
lect his commission. The court obviously overlooked the chief
significance of this case. It is true that the broker was allowed
to recover his commission, but he was not allowed the commis-
sion because the required performance of the brokerage con-
tract had been fulfilled. He was allowed the commission as
damages that occurred when the "sale" was consummated.
The court, therefore, seems to take a view that differs with
the law as previously set forth in its own jurisdiction. It ap-
44. Powers v. Security Say. & Trust Co., 38 Idaho 289, 222 P. 779 (1963) ;
Murphy v. Sawyer, 152 Ky. 645, 153 S.W. 991 (1913); see Lewis v. Dahl, 108
Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362, 367 (1945) (concurring opinion).
45. See, e.g., Mattingly v. Bohn, 84 Ariz. 369, 329 P.2d 1095 (1958); E.A.
Strout Western Realty Agency v. Gregoire, 101 Cal. App. 512, 225 P.2d 585
(1951); Harris v. McPherson, 97 Conn. 164, 115 A. 723 (1922); Brown v.
Mars, 150 N.E.2d 760 (Ind. 1958). See genwrally Note, supra note 11.
46. Park v. Swartz, 110 Tex. 564, 222 S.W. 156 (1920) ; Robertson v. Wil-
son, 121 Wash. 358, 209 P. 841 (1922). See, e.g., 17 Am. Jura 2d Contracts
§ 442 (1964).
47. Crawford v. Cicotte, 186 Mich. 269, 152 N.W. 1065 (1915); Park v.
Swartz, 110 Tex. 564, 222 S.W. 156 (1920) ; Senden v. Loabs, 30 Wis. 2d 618,
151 N.W.2d 865 (1963). Some jurisdictions require that the broker show that
he could have actually produced a buyer or have sold the property within the
brokerage contract period. See, e.g., Wellinger v. Crawford, 48 Ind. App. 176,
93 N.E. 1051 (1911).
48. 191 Ky. 75, 229 S.W. 132 (1921). The case set a precedent in Kentucky.
If the holding of this case had been relied on by the Shankli; court, the
obvious conclusion that a contract of sale is a breach of the contract would
have followed, giving the broker his damages sustained by the breach.
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parently did not consider that the commission may not neces-
sarily be the damages that are sustained when a seller executes
a contract of sale. At any rate, the court fails to distinguish
between an actual fulfillment of the brokerage agreement and
a breach of it. The former entitles a broker to a recovery for
the commission, and the latter entitles him to damages for a
breach.
The Oregon courts have held that a lease executed by the
seller while an exclusive-right-to-sell brokerage agreement exists
between the seller and broker is a breach of the brokerage
agreement making the performance by the broker impossible.49
The breach entitles the broker to damages which are not neces-
sarily his commission. It is difficult to conceive that the Ken-
tucky court could stretch the concept of "sale" to include a
lease. Yet, is the end result of a lease so different from the exe-
cution of a contract of sale that the theory for the remedy of
one should differ with the remedy of the other? Should the
broker be required to show his losses from one and not the
other? Performance is certainly not any more impossible when
a lease has been executed than when an executory contract of
sale has been executed.
The Shanklin case opens the door for inequitable results in
favor of the broker. It sets a precedent from which there is no
escape. It appears that a contract of sale for land in Kentucky
from this point on will be a "sale" regardless of the fact that
the owner of listed property will be put in a precarious position.
V. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the court overlooked an obvious feature
of exclusive listing contracts. These contracts apparently con-
template a double exchange of consideration between the par-
ties. In order to make the brokerage agreement binding at the
moment of formation the broker promises to use his time and
facilities in exchange for the owner's promise to leave the prop-
erty open for "sale" only by the broker.50 This exchange of
promises binds the parties for the contractual period.
It should be obvious at this point that a "sale" of some sort
must occur before a broker is entitled to his commission. This
is the second exchange of consideration. The broker has the
49. Brady v. East Portland Sheet Metal Works, 222 Ore. 584, 352 P.2d 144
(196).
50. See, e.g., Comment, ,tpra note 7.
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duty of attempting to consummate a "sale" of the listed prop-
erty. If he succeeds, the owner then has a duty to pay the
broker his commission for his performance.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion is that
when someone other than the exclusive broker executes a con-
tract of sale with a prospective buyer, the brokerage agreement
requirement fat a "sale" take place has not been fulfilled. In-
stead, the promise of the property owner to keep the "sale" open
for the contract period has been breached. It is the first ex-
change of promises that has been affected by the formation of
the contract of sale. Such a breach has nothing to do with the
second exchange of consideration. The breach of the owner's
promise to leave the "sale" up to the broker should not effect
the owner's duty to pay a commission for a "sale" by the broker.
A consummated "sale" by the broker gives rise to the broker's
commission while a contract of sale or "sale" by anyone else
is merely a breach of the exclusive-right-to-sell agreement which
entitles the broker to a cause of action for damages.
The court could have easily left itself an escape hatch for the
future by reasoning that the contract of sale was a breach of
the brokerage agreement and not a fulfillment of the contractual
requirement. If the court had chosen this alternate course of the
contract of sale being a breach and not a fulfillment of the con-
tract requirement, a contract of sale would not necessarily give
the broker a right to his commission. The broker would have
to show that the only just result would be to grant him his com-
mission as damage. The derelict and unscrupulous broker would
be hampered in his attempt to take the seller for a ride.
At any rate the court could have given itself a more flexible
position for future litigation. The general contract theory of
breach,51 partial breach,52 and damages5" as well as agency 4
51. "A total breach of contract is nonperformance of the duty that is so
material and important as to justify the injured party in regarding the whole
transaction as at an end." A. CoRiN, CoxTRAcrs § 946 (1952). Corbin points
out that there is a difference between a major and minor breach and makes a
distinction as to the rights of an aggrieved party as to each.
52. "A partial breach by one party.., does not justify the other party's
subsequent failure to perform .... " Id.
53. "[A] party who seeks to recover damages from the other to a contract
for a breach must show that he himself is free from fault in respect to per-
formance of a dependent promise or counterpromise ... or a condition pre-
cendent. . . ." 17 A.. Jun. 2d Contracts § 441 (1964).
54. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNm) OF AGENCY § 449, comment d at 363 (1957),
states a breach of the seller's promise not to employ another agent gives rise
to damages which consist of the amount promised less the expenses he would
19691
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law could be applied to future cases if the court had chosen to
consider the contract of sale as a breach.
Whether the conclusion in Shanidin was a just one is another
matter. Granting the broker his commission may have been the
most equitable conclusion. But it is safe to say that the Ken-
tucky court has saddled itself with a precedent of doubtful
validity and with a great potential for injustice.
HUBBARD W. McDoALD, JR.
have incurred. In all events the broker has the duty to show that there was
a probability that he could accomplish the desired result.
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